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This chapter describes the standard method of generational accounting that is 
used, with minor modifications, in all the country studies. This methodology 
was first developed in Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991), on which this 
chapter closely draws. 
Generational accounting is based on the government's intertemporal budget 
constraint. This constraint, written in equation (l), requires that the future net 
tax payments of current and future generations be sufficient, in present value, 
to cover the present value of future government consumption as well as service 
the government's initial net indebtedness.' 
m  m 
N,,  + (1 +  r)+-') c  Nl,k = c  G,(1 +  r)+') - Wf  . 
k=l-D  k=l+l  S=f 
(1) 
The first summation on the left-hand side of equation (1) adds together the 
generational accounts-the  present value of the remaining lifetime net pay- 
ments-of  existing generations. The term Nl,k  stands for the account of the 
generation born in year k. The index k in this summation runs from t -  D 
(those aged D,  the maximum length of life, in year 0) to t (those born in year 0). 
The second summation on the left-hand side of equation (1) adds together 
the present values of the generational accounts of  future generations, with k 
again representing the year of  birth. As each of  these generational accounts 
is expressed in dollars of the respective generation's birth year, they must be 
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1. The constraint does not assume that government debt is ever fully paid off, merely that the 
debt grows less quickly than the rate of  discount-that  it does not explode. Thus it is consistent 
with the long-run existence of government deficits, as long as these deficits are smaller than the 
amount needed simply to service the level of outstanding debt. 
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discounted back to year tin  the summation, using the government’s real before- 
tax return  r. 
The first term on the right-hand side of  equation (1) expresses the present 
value of government consumption. In this summation the values of government 
consumption in years, given by G,, are also discounted to year t. The remaining 
term on the right-hand  side, W;, denotes the government’s net wealth in year 
t-its  assets minus its explicit debt. 
Equation (1) indicates the zero-sum nature of intergenerational fiscal policy. 
Holding the present value of government consumption fixed, a reduction in the 
present  value of  net  taxes  extracted from current  generations  (a decline  in 
the first summation on the left-hand side of eq. [  11) necessitates an increase in the 
present value of net tax payments of future generations. 
The generational account Nr,k  is defined by 
where K = max(t,k). In expression (2)  q,,  stands for the projected average net 
tax payment to the government made in year s by a member of the generation 
born in year k. The term P,,, stands for the number of surviving members of 
the cohort in year s who were born in year k.2 For generations who are born 
prior to year t, the summation begins in year t and is discounted to year t. For 
generations who are born in year k >  t, the summation begins in year k and is 
discounted to that year. 
A set of generational accounts is simply a set of values of N,,k,  one for each 
existing and future generation, with the property that the combined present 
value adds up to the right-hand side of equation (1). Though we distinguish 
male and female cohorts in the results presented below, we suppress sex sub- 
scripts in equations (1) and (2)  to limit notation. 
Note  that  generational  accounts reflect  only taxes paid  less transfers  re- 
ceived. With the exception of government expenditures on health care and edu- 
cation, which are treated as transfer payments, the accounts do not impute to 
particular generations the value of  the government’s purchases of goods and 
services because it is difficult to attribute the benefits of such purchases. There- 
fore, the accounts do not show the full net benefit or burden that any generation 
receives from government policy as a whole, although they can show a genera- 
tion’s net benefit or burden from a particular policy change that affects only 
taxes and transfers. Thus generational accounting tells us which generations 
will pay for government  spending not  included in the accounts, rather than 
2. As discussed in chap. 6 in this volume, by Ablett, the population weights Ps,k  incorporate both 
mortality and immigration, implicitly treating immigration as if it were a “rebirth” and assigning 
the taxes paid by  immigrants to the representative members of their respective cohorts. This ap- 
proach does not, therefore, separate the burdens of natives and immigrants. Such an extension is 
desirable, particularly if one wishes to study the effects on generational accounts of changes in 
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telling us which generations will benefit from that spending. This implies noth- 
ing about the value of government spending; that is, there is no assumption, ex- 
plicit or implicit, concerning the value to households of government purchases. 
2.1  Assessing the Fiscal Burden Facing Future Generations 
Given the right-hand side of equation (1) and the first term on the left-hand 
side of equation (l),  we determine, as a residual, the value of the second term 
on the left-hand side of equation (1), which is the collective (aggregate) pay- 
ment, measured as a time t present value, required of future generations. Based 
on this amount, we determine the average per capita present value lifetime net 
tax payment facing members of each future generation under the assumption 
that the average per capita lifetime net tax payment of members of successive 
generations rises at the economy’s rate of productivity growth. This makes the 
lifetime payment a constant share of  lifetime income. Controlling for this 
growth adjustment, the average per capita lifetime net tax payments of future 
generations are directly comparable with those of current newborns, since the 
per capita generational accounts of both newborns and individual members of 
future generations take into account net tax payments over these agents’ entire 
lifetimes and are discounted back to their respective years of birth. 
Our assumption that the generational accounts of all future generations are 
equal, on a per capita basis, except for a growth adjustment, is just one of many 
assumptions we could make about the distribution across future generations of 
their collective net payment to the government. We could, for example, assume 
a phase-in of the additional fiscal burden (positive or negative) to be imposed 
on future generations, allocating a greater share of the burden to later future 
generations and a smaller share to earlier ones. Clearly, such a phase-in would 
mean that generations born after the phase-in period has elapsed would face, 
on a per capita basis, larger values of lifetime burdens (the NJ  than we are 
calculating here. 
Another way  of measuring the imbalance of fiscal policy, illustrated in the 
chapters that follow, is to ask what permanent change in some tax or transfer 
instrument, such as an increase in income taxes or a reduction in old-age social 
security benefits, would be necessary to equalize the lifetime growth-adjusted 
per capita fiscal burden facing current newborns and future generations. Be- 
cause such policies satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, 
they are also sustainable. 
2.2  Assumptions Underlying Generational Account Calculations 
To  produce generational accounts, we  require projections of  population, 
taxes, transfers, and government expenditures; an initial value of government 
wealth; and a discount rate. We  consider the impact of total, not just national, 
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Typically, we assume that government purchases grow at the same rate as 
GDP, although in some cases we break these purchases down into age-specific 
components and assume that each component remains constant per member of 
the relevant population, adjusted for the overall growth of GDP per capita. This 
causes different components of government purchases to grow more or less 
rapidly  than  GDP according  to  whether  the  relevant  population  grows  or 
shrinks as a share of the overall population. 
Government  infrastructure purchases  are treated like other forms of pur- 
chases in the calculations. Although such purchases provide an ongoing stream 
rather than a one-time amount of services, they must still be paid for. Genera- 
tional accounting clarifies which generation or generations will have to bear 
the burden of these and other purchases. For government wealth, we measure 
the government’s net financial assets-its  financial assets less its gross debt. 
We do not include the real assets of state enterprises in this measure but instead 
subtract projected net profits from state enterprises from projected government 
spending. This procedure effectively capitalizes the value of these enterprises. 
Government wealth does not include the value of the government’s existing 
infrastructure, such as parks. Including such assets would have no impact on 
the estimated fiscal burden facing future generations because including these 
assets would require adding to the projected flow of government purchases an 
offsetting flow of imputed rent on the government’s existing infrastructure. 
Taxes and transfer payments are each broken down into several categories. 
Our general rule regarding tax incidence is to assume that taxes are borne by 
those paying the taxes, when the taxes are paid: income taxes on income, con- 
sumption taxes on consumers, and property taxes on property owners. There 
are two exceptions here, both of  which  involve capital income taxes. First, 
we distinguish between marginal and inframarginal capital income taxes. As 
described below, inframarginal capital income taxes are distributed to existing 
wealth  holders, whereas marginal  capital income taxes are based on future 
projected wealth holdings. Second, in the case of small open economies, mar- 
ginal corporate income taxes are assumed to be borne by (and are therefore 
allocated to) labor. The need for this later adjustment is discussed in chapter 
15, for example. 
The typical  method used to project the average values of particular  taxes 
and transfer payments by age and sex starts with government forecasts of the 
aggregate amounts of each type of  tax  (e.g.,  payroll)  and transfer payment 
(e.g., welfare benefits) in future years. These aggregate amounts are then dis- 
tributed by  age and  sex based  on cross-sectional relative  age-tax  and  age- 
transfer profiles derived from cross-sectional microdata sets. For years beyond 
those for which government forecasts are available, age- and sex-specific aver- 
age tax and transfer amounts are assumed to equal those for the latest year for 
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2.3  Calculating Inframarginal Capital Income Taxes 
Capital income taxes require special treatment because, unlike other taxes, 
they may be capitalized into the values of existing assets. Also, the time pattern 
of income and tax payments may differ. As a result of these features of capital 
income taxes, such taxes must be attributed with care to ensure that they are 
assigned to the proper generation. If all forms of capital income were taxed at 
the same rate, there would be no such problem: all assets would yield the same 
rate of return before tax (adjusted for risk), and each individual would face a 
rate of return reduced by the full extent of the tax. However, if tax rates on the 
income from some assets, typically older ones, are higher than those facing 
income from new assets (e.g., because of investment incentives targeted toward 
new investment), a simple arbitrage argument indicates that the extra tax bur- 
den on the old assets should be capitalized into these assets’ values. 
To illustrate the nature of the necessary correction, consider the case of cash- 
flow taxation in which assets are written off immediately. A well-known result 
is that the effective marginal capital income tax rate under cash-flow taxation 
is zero. However, taxes would be collected each year on existing capital assets, 
and such assets should therefore be valued at a discount. Assigning these taxes 
to the assets’ initial owners, rather than to members of future generations who 
may purchase the assets, is consistent with the fact that such future generations 
of individuals may freely invest in new assets and pay a zero rate of tax on the 
resulting income. Our correction to actual tax payments should, in this case, 
result in a zero tax burden on the income from new assets. 
For the general case, we use the following methodology. Our calculation 
begins with expression (3) for the user cost of capital, to which firms set their 
marginal products: 
(3) 
(r  +  S)(l - k - TZ) 
(1 - 7) 
c= 
where r is the investor’s required after-tax return, 6 is the investment’s eco- 
nomic rate of depreciation, T  is the investor’s marginal tax rate, k is the invest- 
ment tax credit or grant received on investment, and z is the present value of 
depreciation allowances. We wish to calculate two measures. The first, which 
we denote by  Q, is the tax-based discount on old capital, which equals the 
difference between tax savings from depreciation allowances and investment 
credits per unit of new capital and those available per unit of existing capital: 
(4) 
where zo is the present value of depreciation allowances per unit of old capital. 
Measured capital income tax payments are not based on the effective rate of 
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(5)  c-(r+  6) 
c-  6 
m= 
Instead, they are based on an average tax rate, a,  where 
T(C - b) - k 
c-  6 
a= 
and b is the average current depreciation deduction per unit of  total capital. 
Comparing equations (5) and (6)  indicates that we must correct measured taxes 
per unit of capital by subtracting from a(C -  6) the term A, where 
(7)  A  = (a  - m)(C - 6). 
The values of  zo and b depend on past patterns of investment and the deprecia- 
tion schedules permitted  existing assets. For the case in which investment 
grows smoothly at rate n and all capital (new and old) is written off at rate IJJ 
based on historic asset cost, the value of undepreciated basis per unit of ex- 
isting capital may be shown to equal 
n+  6 
n+  a+  *’ 
where T  is the rate of inflation. Thus the value of b, the average current depreci- 
ation deduction per unit of capital, is $ multiplied by this basis: 
b=$  (9) 
n+  6 
n+  a+  6’ 
and the value of p,  the present value of depreciation deductions per unit of 
existing capital, equals 
(10) 
where z is the present value of depreciation deductions per unit of basis (and 
per unit of new capital), 
n+  6 
n+  a+  +’  z‘  =  z 
* 
r+a+  *  z= 
Substituting equations (3,  (6), (9), and (1  1) into equation (7), we obtain 
(12) 
Substituting equation (10) into equation (4), we obtain 
(13) 
(r  +  a  +  +)(n  +  6) 
(n  +  a  +  $)(r +  6) 
A  =  (1. +  6)~z  1 -  [ 
Q  =  k+  TZ(~-  n+6 ). 
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Based on parameter values for the United States in the 1990s, Auerbach et al. 
(1991) estimated values of A = .00111 and Q = .111. 
There are other possible assumptions we could make about the incidence of 
capital income taxes. For a small open economy, for example, it may make 
sense to assume that taxes on mobile corporate capital are borne by local, fixed 
factors such as 1ab0r.~ 
2.4  Discount Rates and Uncertainty 
For base-case calculations, generational accounts typically use a real rate of 
discount in the neighborhood of 5 percent, a rate that exceeds the real govern- 
ment short-term borrowing rate in most developed countries. This rate seems 
justified  given the riskiness of  the flows being discounted. However, as we 
now discuss, the “right” discount rate to use is in sufficient question to merit 
presenting results based on a range of alternative discount rates-a  practice 
routinely followed by generational accountants. 
The appropriate discount rate for calculating the present value of future gov- 
ernment revenues and expenditures depends on their uncertainty. If  all such 
flows were certain and riskless, it would clearly be appropriate to discount 
them using the prevailing term structure of risk-free interest rates. However, 
even in this simple and unrealistic case, such discounting could be problematic 
since it would require knowing the values of this term structure. To discern 
these values, one might examine the real yields paid on short-term, medium- 
term, and long-term inflation-indexed government bonds. But this presupposes 
the existence of such bonds. Many countries do not issue indexed bonds, and 
those  that  do don’t  necessarily  issue indexed  bonds of  all maturities.  The 
United States is a case in point. It has just begun to issue indexed bonds but so 
far has limited its issue of such bonds to those with 10-year maturities. Even if 
a country issues indexed bonds of multiple maturities, equating their real yields 
with the risk-free rate requires assuming no default risk, which for many coun- 
tries is a very strong assumption. 
In the realistic case in which countries’ tax revenues and expenditures are 
uncertain, discerning the correct discount rate is even more difficult. In this 
case, discounting based on the term structure of risk-free rates (even if it is 
observable) is no longer theoretically justified. Instead, the appropriate dis- 
count rates would be those that adjust for the riskiness of the stream in ques- 
tion. Since the riskiness of taxes, spending, and transfer payments presumably 
differ, the theoretically  appropriate risk-adjusted  rates at which to discount 
taxes, spending, and transfer payments would also differ. 
Is risk adjusting really important? A priori, one might think that forming 
the expected present value of future taxes and transfers of  current and future 
generations, with discounting done at risk-free rates, would yield a meaningful 
3. This approach is taken in Auerbach et al. (1997) for New Zealand. 38  Alan J. Auerbach and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
measure of the fiscal burdens facing different generations on a~erage.~  But this 
is not the case as the following line of argument, relying on the invariance of 
economic outcomes under changes in fiscal labels, makes clear. 
Chapter  1 points out that there are an infinite  number of ways to label a 
country’s underlying fiscal policy. If economic agents are rational, the choice 
of labels will have no real impact, including no impact on the intergenerational 
distribution of  well-being-which  generational accounting seeks to help illu- 
minate. This proposition that economic outcomes are invariant under changes 
in the government’s vocabulary is true regardless of whether the economy fea- 
tures uncertainty, including uncertain government policy. However, in the con- 
text of  uncertain  government policy, relabeling  fiscal policy can easily alter 
expected future taxes and expected future transfer payments. Such relabeling 
will also alter the riskiness of reported taxes and transfer payments and, there- 
fore, the proper rates at which to discount expected future tax and transfer 
streams. If one discounts these altered expected values with the proper risk- 
adjusted discount rates, one finds what one should find: no change in the ex- 
pected utilities of  any generation. However, if one simply uses the time path 
of risk-free rates of return to discount the expected value of future taxes and 
transfers,  one gets nonsensical  results: the “expected”  fiscal burdens  facing 
alternative generations depend on how the fiscal policy is labeled; that is, they 
depend on the government’s choice of vocabulary. 
An example may  help clarify this point. Take the case of  a fully funded 
defined-benefit social security system. Suppose the government has held risk- 
free bonds and now chooses instead to invest in risky stock. To acquire the 
stock, the government sells the public its bonds. Consequently, the public ends 
up holding stock through the government and bonds in its private portfolio. If 
the stocks perform well, the government rebates to the public (in the form of a 
transfer payment) the amount beyond what is needed to cover its social security 
pension  obligations. If  the stocks perform  poorly, the government taxes the 
public to cover its social security obligations. 
Hence, under the “new”  policy, the public receives  a sure income on the 
bonds that it has purchased from the government but a risky stream associated 
with the transfers or taxes it now faces. On balance, the public ends up with 
exactly the same income; that is, it gets the same social security pension in- 
come, and the combination of its safe bond income and its now risky net taxes 
is equivalent to its holding  directly the  stock  sold to the government. This 
“portfolio” change on the part of the government alters the expected net tax 
payments of the public but has no real effects-it  is nothing more than a rela- 
beling of government receipts and payments. The fact that the government and 
4. Diamond‘s  (1  996) presentation of “projections” seems to come close to endorsing such analy- 
sis, although Diamonds main argument is the same as we make here, namely, that properly valuing 
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the private sector exchange different securities with the public is simply part 
of the relabeling process, not evidence that policy has fundamentally changed. 
Another issue that arises with respect to risk-adjusted discounting is that the 
proper risk adjustments may be generation specific. To see this, consider a two- 
period  model  in  which there  are two  generations  and no government  pur- 
chases-just  an initial stock of debt that needs to be serviced and repaid in the 
second period. Generation  1, currently alive, will pay some tax rate, T,  times 
its uncertain  income,  and generation  2, not  yet alive,  will pay  the residual. 
Since, by  construction, the payments of  the two generations equal principal 
plus interest on the debt in every state of nature, the government’s intertempo- 
ral budget constraint is always satisfied. 
In this example, aggregate tax payments are certain, although each genera- 
tion’s own tax payments are not. For generation  l, the uncertainty of  its tax 
payments are actually a plus, since its risky income is being insured. Thus we 
would be justified in applying a discount rate of p > r, where r is the risk-free 
rate, in valuing the expected  tax payments from generation  1’s perspective. 
From generation  2’s  point of view, the situation is more complicated.  It de- 
pends on how much generation 2’s marginal utility of consumption is corre- 
lated with that of generation  1. If there were perfect correlation (say, because 
of a single source of income or complete intergenerational risk sharing), then 
generation 2’s burden would be greater than that implied by discounting at the 
risk-free rate-its  burden would be relatively higher in bad (low income) states 
of nature-so  its expected tax payments should be discounted at a rate p < r. 
Hence, by discounting the burdens of each generation at an appropriate dis- 
count rate (higher than the risk-free rate for generation 1, lower than the risk- 
free rate for generation  2), we would still find that the sum of the burdens 
satisfied the government’s intertemporal budget constraint but get a better mea- 
sure of the impact on individual utility. 
To see the implications of this result, let us go back to the general, multi- 
period and multigeneration model and assume again for the moment that there 
is a single set of state-contingent future prices that all generations use to evalu- 
ate future flows. Then our current  approach, to define the burden on future 
generations as a residual, gives a correct measure of the aggregate burden on 
future generations. That is, we define this collective burden as 
where NO,k  is the generational account for the generation born in year k, formed 
by discounting that generation’s flows using the discount rate p. As long as p is 
chosen appropriately (as already discussed, this would include, perhaps, using 
different values of p for government purchases than for taxes and transfers), 
N,,, is the value of the burden placed on future generations. Note that this pro- 
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by future generations, but rather the value of these payments based on the valu- 
ation that would be placed on such payments by existing generations. 
But now  we must come back to consider how to value the residual flows 
that must be paid by future generations under incomplete risk sharing across 
generations. Consider again the simple model with two agents. In this instance, 
we cannot use a discount rate based on generation 1’s valuation of generation 
2’s burden. If  we evaluate generation 2’s burden from its own point of  view, 
the burden may  be lower. For example, suppose that the income of  the two 
generations is negatively correlated; the negative correlation might arise if, for 
example, the source of  shocks was to the relative productivity of  capital and 
labor and generation 1 (2) supplied capital (labor). Then generation 2’s burden, 
from its own perspective, will be less onerous than a certain burden with the 
same expected value. This is because generation 2’s taxes will be higher in 
states in which its income is higher (even though generation  1’s income is 
lower). Hence, we  should discount generation 2’s expected burden at a rate 
higher than the risk-free rate. Thus both generations will perceive lower bur- 
dens than would be implied by discounting their respective expected tax pay- 
ments  at the risk-free rate. Since the total burden  in the  second period is 
(1 + r)&,  this means that the sum of the burdens from the individual perspec- 
tives will be lower than the present value of the debt repayment-because  gov- 
ernment policy improves intergenerational risk sharing. 
In short, with incomplete risk sharing, we cannot use the valuations of ex- 
isting generations to discount the flows of future generations. Indeed, we do 
not even have the valuations of existing generations to rely on for future years 
that occur after all current generations are decea~ed.~ 
Our standard approach, then, may  overstate the burdens on future genera- 
tions to the extent that government policy improves intergenerational risk shar- 
ing.  However, it may  be justified  with  the argument that  such benefits  of 
government policy should be considered separately from the first-order redis- 
tributions among generations, in the same way that, as discussed in chapter 3, 
we ignore changes in deadweight loss associated with fiscal policy changes. 
In summary, measuring fiscal policy’s welfare effects on different genera- 
tions, as generational accounting seeks to do, requires an evaluation of the risk 
characteristics of fiscal flows and an appropriate risk adjustment of these flows 
or, as an approximate substitute, the use of risk-adjusted discount rates. At- 
tempts to sidestep this issue simply by discounting expected flows with a risk- 
free rate of interest are plagued by  the same fundamental problem as deficit 
accounting-the  resulting measures would not be invariant with respect to 
changes in the superficial labels attached to government transactions. As gener- 
ational accounting methods to date have not fully identified the appropriate 
5.  Adding the possibility of  incomplete intrngenerational risk sharing would simply extend the 
complexity one additional step. Even within a generation, the total burden might be lighter than 
would be implied by discounting that generation’s overall payments with a market discount rate. 41  The Methodology of Generational Accounting 
adjustment for risk, it remains standard practice to estimate generational ac- 
counts for a range of discount rates. 
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